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Abstract 
 
How are platforms built and how do they evolve? This 
is a salient question in digital ecosystems, where the 
competition has moved from traditional one-sided 
business logics to multi-sided platforms. In this paper, 
we explore how a digital platform evolves when the 
organization of the multilayered platform architecture, 
and related control points, is modified through 
competitive moves. We also examine how a firm may 
be able to manage the increased complexity of the 
platform. We show that when technical and strategic 
bottlenecks are solved, the platform owner can expand 
control to strategically important layers of the platform 
stack. The findings indicate that the complexity of the 
platform increases through a series of competitive 
moves. However, complexity can be managed by 
increasing the standardization of the platform 
interfaces, and by jockeying for a stronger position in 
critical parts of the platform stack.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The digitization of product platforms has spawned 
services which radically change business models and 
disrupt ecosystems. The very existence of specific 
industries has been called into question. For example, 
LG and Sharp recently launched TV models which 
feature a software-based game console (client 
software), and which connect a TV set equipped with a 
control pad to a gaming platform in the cloud, thereby 
encroaching on the game console industry. Recent 
research has significantly increased our knowledge of 
the organizational and business mechanisms that 
underlie digital platform innovations (e.g. [1, 2, 3, 33]). 
They have also shown that the competition results in 
increased platform complexity (e.g. [4, 5]), and in new 
competitive landscapes among and within platforms 
(e.g. [6, 7, 8, 9]). However, we know little of how 
digital platforms evolve over time, or of the 
mechanisms that influence such growth – topics that 
are highly important for platform theory [9, 10]. One 
key question in understanding digital platform 
evolution concerns which types of competitive moves1 
constitute a successful evolutionary path for platform 
growth, given the dynamics of the marketplace. 
We also know little of how the design architecture 
of the digital platform needs to evolve when new 
competitive moves add, modify, or remove platform 
features. During this dynamic, a firm typically seeks to 
create a new market position by modifying elements in 
one or several layers of the platform stack [3]. The firm 
can also seek to act as a platform for platforms for 
services located in other layers of the service stack, and 
thereby create a new control point. Furthermore, as the 
overall platform evolves, and as new services and 
features are added, the number of participating actors 
will increase, as well as the types of couplings between 
the actors. This increases the overall complexity of the 
platform stack and may challenge its effective 
management. Matters are further complicated by the 
fact that different actors can now gain access to 
different control points of the architecture, located in 
different layers of the platform [5].  
Due to the swift changes in the configurations, the 
control of the overall structure of the platform will 
change as evolution occurs, especially when specific 
technologies or services at a certain layer become 
technical or business-related bottlenecks [11]. These 
dynamics increase the complexity of the platform, in 
terms of how the services can be orchestrated and 
managed. Nevertheless, we currently know little of 
how overall digital platform management unfolds, due 
to the fact that studies up to now have primarily 
investigated the phenomenon statically, over brief time 
periods [7, 9, 12]. Nor does the extant literature 
address how the digital platform is built from scratch 
by a nascent firm, or how the firm then engages in a 
specific series of competitive moves over time. There 
are several possibilities to engage in such moves at any 
given time point, as afforded by the layered 
architecture. The need is thus to discover specific rules 
that govern the selection of appropriate moves, given 
the history that applies, and the specific circumstances. 
One way to decipher such moves is to track 
                                                1	The	aim	of	a	competitive	move	is	to	improve,	reposition,	or	defend	a	firm’s	position	in	the	market.	
Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50017
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Page 1026
competitive moves longitudinally within a platform, 
differentiating moves that center on different layers, 
and analyzing how such moves relate to the overall 
logics of the digital platform growth. 
Our study aimed to address these gaps in current 
understandings of platform theory. In particular, we 
were interested in the kinds of competitive moves that 
might lead to a software product being “platformized” 
within chosen markets. Thus, we examined (1) how a 
digital platform owner was able to reconfigure the 
platform stack over time by engaging in a specific 
sequence of competitive moves, (2) to what extent 
these competitive moves changed elements at different 
layers of the stack and thereby changed the dynamics 
of control over the stack, and (3) how such moves may 
potentially influence platform complexity, including 
how such complexity can be managed through 
garnering new firm-level capabilities. In addressing 
these questions, our study responded to recent calls to 
investigate factors that may influence a firm’s strategic 
choices in situations of digitally-enabled competition 
[3], and the dynamics of platform evolution [9, 10, 13]. 
Our study also sought to shed light on the origins of 
increasing platform complexity [1, 4, 5]. With these 
considerations in view, we conducted a longitudinal 
case study, covering more than a decade, to explore the 
evolution and competitive logics associated with a 
digital platform in the gaming industry.  
 
2. Conceptual development 
 
A platform forms a competitive foundation upon 
which other firms can develop content, innovate with 
complementary technologies, and create new services 
[13]. In this paper, we focus on digital platforms, with 
such a platform defined as “the extensible codebase of 
a software-based system that provides core 
functionality shared by the modules that interoperate 
with it and the interfaces through which they 
interoperate” [10, p. 672]. Such platforms are typically 
organized as a loosely coupled layered modular 
architecture. This organization enables firms to 
innovate simultaneously at different layers of the 
architecture, and to compete on related services [3]. 
Most digital platforms operate on two-sided markets; 
hence, content providers and end-users interact through 
the platform and thereby enjoy direct and indirect 
network effects [6, 9]. In such markets, a key challenge 
is how firms can design, build, control, and sustain the 
competitiveness of the platform by orchestrating an 
ecosystem that will invite participation from both sides 
of the platform [3]. Typically, this happens by 
positioning the platform through aggressive, novel, and 
swift competitive moves, aiming to achieve a dominant 
position on either or both sides of the market.  
 
2.1. Evolution of the platform stack 
 
Digital platforms change by effecting changes at 
some level of a multilayered platform stack, including 
the relationships between the stack layers. By tracing 
such changes, we can understand how the platform is 
organized, and the essential couplings between 
different layers [3, 9]. Such connections also reveal 
how the platform stack is connected to a variety of 
actors in the overall ecosystem. We can conceptualize 
the platform stack as a loosely coupled layered 
modular architecture with four layers, comprising (i) a 
device, (ii) a network, (ii) a service, and (iv) content. 
The device layer refers to physical devices that can be 
used to connect and interact with the platform (e.g. a 
specific TV set, mobile phone, etc.). The network layer 
refers to the network protocols that the platform uses to 
communicate over the network to different devices. 
The service layer relates to the functionality of the 
applications that enable customers to use the content-
related services. The content layer includes the content 
that customers interact with, e.g. new videos (cf. [3]). 
By studying the platform stack as a layered 
modular architecture, we can recognize the loosely 
coupled nature of the digital platform. Loose coupling 
implies that the platform interacts with an open-ended 
range of devices, networks, services, and content [3]. 
Accordingly, the designers of the components of a 
layer in the layered modular architecture cannot fully 
predict how the designed component will be used in 
the future (in the context of a new service), or how it 
might impact on other layers [3]. Having a layered 
modular architecture allows innovations to occur 
independently at any layer. This also means that a 
change in one layer will propagate non-linear changes 
in other layers, creating opportunities or restrictions for 
the platform owner.  
There are at least three distinct groups of actors that 
participate in a digital platform ecosystem organized 
around layered platform architecture. These are the 
platform owners, the content providers, and the end-
users [9]. Each actor has unique needs and motivations 
to participate within the different layers of the platform 
stack. The actors may control different layers of the 
platform stack, in part or as a whole. The control can 
be based on either strategic or technical “bottlenecks” 
[11, 21]. In the event of technical bottlenecks, there 
may at a certain layer be few or no alternative 
technologies that a firm can use to bring the platform-
related service to the market (cf. [11]). Strategic 
bottlenecks refer to actions whereby a firm can prevent 
or limit other actors’ access to their platform [11].  
Commonly, platform owners will try to attract more 
content providers for their platform to make it more 
attractive to platform users [6, 9]. To facilitate such 
content acquisition, the platform owner can provide 
content providers with access and resources that will 
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facilitate the development of attractive services for the 
platform [9, 12]. These resources can be application 
programming interfaces (APIs) or software 
development kits (SDKs) that third-party developers 
can use to bring their innovations more easily to the 
platform [22].  
Because several competing platforms are available 
on specific layers, platform owners typically seek to 
“multihome” their services [23, 24]. In multihoming, a 
content provider may, for example, use more than one 
channel to offer content to end-users, or end-users can 
use more than one device or network to gain access to 
the content [9]. In the context of this study, we are 
interested in “platform multihoming.” In this case, a 
platform owner seeks to multihome the platform across 
different channels on the network layer, or across 
multiple devices in the device layer, so that both 
service providers and end-users can enjoy more ways 
to gain access to the service. The approach in our study 
differed from previous studies on multihoming, in that 
the latter have primarily focused on multihoming 
problems from the viewpoint of either the content 
provider or the end-user (see e.g. [9, 23, 24]).  
 
2.2. Competitive moves 
 
Digital platform evolution consists of a sequence of 
competitive moves organized at different levels of the 
multi-layered platform stack. Such competitive moves 
can be conceptualized as a firm’s distinct and discrete 
actions in the market place [14], with “action” defined 
as “a specific and detectable market move” initiated by 
a firm. The moves can either be proactive or reactive. 
Proactive moves seek to improve or re-position the 
firm’s position in the market, while reactive moves are 
generated as a response by the firm to defend its 
position in the market [14]. These moves are informed 
by a rationale offered by the managers [14], and such a 
rationale can be expressed in a set of rules anchored in 
specific cause-and-effect models that are anticipated 
while engaging in the move [15, 16]. Overall, a firm’s 
strategy can be conceptualized as an emergent pattern 
of moves and related rationales [14, 15, 16]. In our 
case, such moves were related to a series of 
interactions between a platform and its environment. 
By investigating these moves and related rationales, it 
was possible to observe and understand the logics of 
digital platform evolution [10]. 
Through competitive moves, the firm’s platform 
innovation typically evolves toward a more complex 
structure. One reason for this is that digital platforms 
(due to their loosely coupled and networked nature) 
constitute highly complex structures over time [4, 5]. 
Moreover, due to the flexibility of the software, such 
structures can develop and grow in unpredictable ways 
[9]. One indication of growing complexity is the 
exponential growth of actors associated with either side 
of the platform market [8]. Another indication is the 
growth of new couplings, with different actors on 
different sides of the platform in different layers. 
Finally, the diversity and type of connections within 
the stack also signals increasing complexity (cf. [17]). 
As the complexity grows, the platform becomes 
technologically more sophisticated, in connecting to a 
larger number of components. It will tend to include a 
larger number of interfaces whereby the size of the 
codebase grows exponentially. These all increase the 
internal and external complexity of the platform, and 
make the platform more challenging to manage and 
evolve. 
When a firm starts to evolve a platform, the 
strategic goals of the platform may change constantly 
as new technologies emerge, as market needs shift, and 
as consumer or technology preferences change (cf. [8, 
18]. To better understand the competitive logic of 
platform creation, one can adopt some ideas from 
complexity theory [19], especially regarding nonlinear 
outcomes based on rapid transitions and co-
evolutionary processes, and the ways in which order 
emerges from such processes [18, 20] In the present 
study, we were especially interested in how a digital 
platform owner can create order by stabilizing and 
destabilizing the platform stack in non-linear ways, 
through a sequence of competitive moves.  
 
3. Research method  
 
To address our research questions, we conducted a 
longitudinal, exploratory case study. We chose this 
method because it made it possible to cater for the 
empirically rich and detailed data of a complex and 
understudied phenomenon [25, 26]. The longitudinal 
case study method also facilitated an examination of 
long-term changes in the case firm’s competitive 
landscape. We selected the case firm for this study 
using three criteria: (i) the firm develops digital 
platform for multi-sided markets, (ii) the firm and the 
platform have a long history, making it possible to 
observe the competitive moves over an extended 
stretch of time, and (iii) the firm is relatively small, 
making it easier to observe actions taken in the 
development process within the market [27].  
 
3.1. The case firm 
 
The case firm, G-cluster, has developed a digital 
platform for cloud gaming services. The platform 
allows computer and console games to be played 
across various devices. The platform is operated by the 
game servers that transmit games as (i) an MPEG 
stream to client devices over a network operator’s 
landline or high-speed wireless network, or (ii) over-
the-top (OTT), as a stand-alone game service. The 
client devices receive the stream, display the game, and 
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transmit the users’ commands back to the game server 
operating the game. G-cluster was founded in Finland 
in 2000. Currently, G-cluster has its headquarters in 
Japan, and its R&D activities in Finland. 
 
3.2. Data collection 
 
We collected several types of empirical material 
covering the entire history of the case firm, from 2000 
to 2015. The most important source was interviews 
with the managers of the firm. These took place 
between 2005 and 2016. In total we conducted 28 
interviews, each lasting around 45–90 minutes. 
Because the case firm is relatively small, interviews 
with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) formed the 
main source of information. However, to improve the 
validity of the study, to avoid personal bias, to 
triangulate, and to gain the most relevant knowledge 
for each topic covered [29], we interviewed eight 
additional employees in the firm. To reduce recall bias, 
we also interviewed the CEO and four employees more 
than once. The interviewees were selected on the basis 
of their knowledge related to various phases of the 
platform evolution and market development. 
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with three 
employees of the case firm's main partner in Japan to 
acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the 
evolution of the platform.  
All the interviews began with background 
information on the interviewee, including the 
interviewee’s role in the firm, and involvement in 
platform development. The first interviews focused on 
the history of the firm with respect to the creation of 
the platform and its initial development. Thereafter, 
each follow-up interview focused on platform and 
business development since the previous interview. All 
the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
This resulted in 305 single-spaced pages of interview 
data. To avoid retrospective bias [29], we collected 
around 180 pages touching on several types of 
secondary data. These covered the whole history of the 
firm, the aim being to validate the interview data 
whenever possible.  
 
3.3. Data analysis 
 
Inductive techniques were applied to analyze the 
qualitative data acquired from the case firm [27, 28, 
30]. We first carried out data reduction [28] by 
synthesizing the complete transcripts from the 
interviews and secondary data [27] into a baseline 
document covering the history of the firm. Here we 
followed Pettigrew [31], who recommends arranging 
incoherent aspects of context evolution in 
chronological order, the aim being to facilitate 
understanding of the causal links between critical 
events.  
After the data reduction, we coded the interview 
data using open thematic content analysis [32]. As a 
first step, we traced the emerging stages in the platform 
evolution, using the framework for layered modular 
architecture devised by Yoo et al. [3] as a template for 
coding. On the basis of the framework, we coded for 
all the changes in the different layers of the stack for 
each competitive move. We next organized these 
changes into a sequence of “platform stacks” arranged 
in chronological order, seeking thus to synthesize the 
entire history of platform configurations. Thereafter, 
we attempted to discover and identify the motivations 
for the competitive moves, with reference to the case 
history. Here our approach was similar to that of 
Woodard et al. [2]. In applying this method, a move 
was conceptualized as a logical grouping of sequential 
changes in the platform stack.  
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1. Competitive moves and changes in the 
platform stack 
 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the changes in the 
platform stack, depicting the relevant actors at each 
layer and the technology/service provided at each 
stage. The colored boxes illustrate changes associated 
with each move when new technology, or a new 
service, was added to some layer. Table 1 synthesizes 
each competitive move and its scope within the 
platform stack; it also gives a brief description of the 
success of the move, and initial reasons behind the 
competitive move. By reviewing changes in the 
platform stack we were able to trace how the evolution 
of the platform and related stack configurations 
impacted on the growth of the multisided market.  
 
4.1.1. Platform stack #1. The first two competitive 
moves were associated with initial development and 
experimentation pertaining to the digital platform for 
true commercial use. At its inception, G-cluster 
focused on finding a device that was “right” in terms of 
bringing to the market a general, mobile gaming 
service. Accordingly, the first platform stack, 
configured in 2000–2001, was created by two 
consecutive competitive moves. The first competitive 
move was the launching of the gaming service for 3G 
networks and the introduction of client software for 3G 
mobile phones. However, at this point there were no 
operational and robust 3G networks available; hence 
the market penetration of the 3G technologies proved 
to be much slower than initially predicted. This meant 
that the first move failed because of the technical 
limitations of the network layer. 
As their second competitive move, G-cluster 
piloted a service using a server that was connected to 
PDAs over the Wi-Fi network. The pilot worked and 
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they were able to show the value of the platform to 
both sides of the market (value proposition). Though 
the pilot was successful, the development of the 
supporting infrastructure (3G networks and 3G mobile 
phones) and markets was much slower than had been 
initially estimated. In addition, 3G networks proved 
unreliable for handling the real-time bit-stream without 
latency. Hence, G-cluster fairly quickly abandoned the 
idea of 3G networks, moving instead to offering games 
on fixed networks. 
 
4.1.2. Platform stack #2. The third competitive move 
was based on G-cluster’s realization that it had to 
configure its platform stack for fixed networks. The 
reconfiguration adopted in 2002 was significant, 
including as it did changes to the platform stack at the 
device, network, and content layers. The aim was to 
home the gaming service into the IPTV markets that 
were emerging as a new way to deliver digital content 
to televisions using set-top boxes. The solution was 
successfully implemented on a pilot basis. However, 
the IPTV operator headed into financial problems, and 
was unable to continue cooperation with G-cluster.  
 
4.1.3. Platform stack #3. The third platform stack 
configuration, in 2003–2004, encompassed three 
competitive moves. The platform, with its capabilities 
to deliver real-time game content between terminal 
devices and a server, attracted increasing interest in the 
marketplace. As a result, G-cluster was acquired by a 
Japanese firm, Broadmedia (competitive move #4). At 
the time, Broadmedia was a part of a large Japanese 
telecom corporation (SoftBank) that owned Japan’s 
largest ADSL network. The firm was actively 
developing IPTV services, including video-on-demand 
services, within Japan. This move helped in gaining 
access to the Japanese markets and in reaching towards 
an existing customer base. In addition, it facilitated the 
acquisition of new and more advanced content from 
game publishers at the content layer.  
Though G-cluster had its platform configured for 
IPTV providers, the integration of the client software 
to the set-up boxes used for IPTV services proved to be 
more difficult than expected (competitive move #5). 
The difficulties were related again to the immaturity of 
IPTV services. The corporation had successfully 
launched its video-on-demand services, but it did not 
want to risk this service by integrating it with a new 
service offered by G-cluster. In addition, only a limited 
proportion of consumers used IPTV services when the 
technology was made available. Altogether, 
commercialization of the platform was unsuccessful at 
this stage, because of the immaturity of the relevant 
network infrastructures, markets, and supporting 
ecosystems. Because the commercialization of the 
service to IPTV networks failed, G-cluster configured 
the platform stack for existing Internet technology as 
their next competitive move, #6. Device and network 
layers were reconfigured for PC and Mac computers, 
and at the service layer, client software was developed 
for PC and Mac. In practice, players downloaded client 
software for their computers from the Yahoo BB Japan 
website. Thereafter, they were able to play casual 
games over the broadband connection. Altogether, the 
third platform stack reconfiguration made it possible to 
commercialize the service.  
 
4.1.4. Platform stack #4. The fourth platform 
reconfiguration made it possible to expand the device 
layer to set-top boxes via IPTV operators. Though the 
previous competitive move had made it possible to 
commercialize the service, the PC and Mac markets 
proved unprofitable, because of intense competition 
from the traditional computer game market. Hence, to 
expand the market potential for the platform, the 
company actively searched for potential IPTV 
providers, having already configured client software 
for set-top boxes. Accordingly, in 2005 G-cluster got 
its first IPTV customer, the Cyprus telecommunication 
Authority (CYTA). This competitive move, #7, 
enabled the company to expand tits device portfolio 
from PC and Mac users to IPTV users, and to 
“multihome” its gaming service.  
 
4.1.5. Platform stack #5. In 2008, as its next 
competitive move, #8, G-cluster started to configure its 
platform stack for cable TV networks in the USA. 
Cable TV operators have traditionally had a strong 
position in the USA market, and the market commands 
a huge customer base. The strong position of the cable 
TV operators in the market meant that the number of 
IPTV providers (through the ADSL network) was 
small. For these reasons, G-cluster began to configure 
its platform and client software on Data Over Cable 
Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) networks, 
and on related DOCSIS set-top boxes. However, the 
configuration proved to be difficult to implement, 
because in most cases, the return channel from the end-
users to the server running the game was too slow. As 
a result, G-cluster was not able to commercialize its 
service in the DOCSIS network. 
 
4.1.6. Platform stack #6. The next platform stack 
configuration, resulted from two competitive moves. 
Earlier competitive moves had brought reliability to the 
platform service and demonstrated proofs of the 
concepts. This enabled the company to start 
negotiating with large telecom operators who could 
offer similar gaming services on their networks. 
Competitive move #9 was related to the launch of the 
service in France. G-cluster started to cooperate with a 
French telecommunication company (SFR), and in 
2010 jointly commercialized the service in France 
through SFR’s IPTV network. 
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Figure 1. Platform stack configurations  
 
Platform stack Competitive move Outcome of the competitive 
move 
Reason for the competitive move 
Platform stack #1 
20002001 
 
#1: Service for mobile phones to enable stream 
mobile games over 3G network  
#2: Client software for PDAs to pilot how the 
service works 
#1: Unsuccessful  
(Technical bottleneck) 
#2: Successful 
 
#1: Market entry 
#2: Value proposition 
Platform stack #2 
2002 
#3: Client software for set-top boxes  #3: Unsuccessful (Technical 
bottleneck) 
#3: Market entry 
Platform stack #3 
2003-2004 
#4: Acquisition by Broadmedia 
#5: Client software for set-top boxes  
#6: Client software for PC and Mac 
#4: Successful 
#5: Unsuccessful (Technical 
bottleneck) 
#6: Successful 
#4: Market entry 
#5: Market entry 
#6: Market expansion/Value proposition 
Platform stack #4 
2005-2007 
#7: Client software for set-top boxes #7: Successful #7: Market expansion/ Value proposition 
Platform stack #5 
2008-2009 
#8: Client software for cable TV set-top boxes  #8: Unsuccessful (Technical 
bottleneck) 
#8: Market expansion 
Platform stack #6 
2010-2012 
#9: Platform commercialized by a reliable partner 
#10: SDK for game publishers 
#9: Successful 
#10: Successful 
#9: Market expansion/Value proposition 
#10: Value proposition 
Platform stack #7 
2013 
#11: Development of cloud gaming console #11: Successful #11: Market expansion/Value proposition 
Platform stack #8 
2014-2015 
#12: Client software for TVs 
#13: CLIK for game developers 
#14: Client software for 4G mobile phones. 
#15: Exclusive game content for the platform 
#16: Client software for cable TV set-top boxes 
#12: Successful 
#13: Successful 
#14: Successful 
#15: Successful 
#16: Successful 
#12: Market expansion/Value proposition 
#13: Value proposition 
#14: Market expansion/Value proposition 
#15: Value proposition 
#16: Market expansion/Value proposition 
 
Table 1. Competitive moves related to each platform stack configuration
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This increased the credibility of the service
with other telecom operators. Following its successful 
launch of the service, in 2012, G-cluster gained its next 
content delivery contract with Orange, also for the 
French market. The increased size of the market helped 
it to negotiate and acquire advanced and recent content 
from game publishers. The service started to attract 
increased attention among well-known game 
publishers, such as Disney, Warner Brothers, and 
Electronic Arts, all of which started to offer content on 
the platform. These contracts enabled the company to 
expand the content layer from casual games to the 
latest high-end games.  
In 2010, G-cluster launched its own SDK for game 
publishers, as competitive move #10. The SDK 
facilitated the porting of games to the platform. Now 
the game developers were able to write their games 
directly to G-cluster's platform.  
Altogether, this platform stack reconfiguration 
introduced important changes, enabling initial 
stabilization of G-cluster’s position in the market. In 
the first place, it decreased complexity, as the service 
was now provided purely via an IPTV operator that 
controlled the device and network layers. Secondly, it 
permitted duplication of the service for other IPTV 
providers, without increasing the service complexity. 
Thirdly, it attracted the attention of content providers; 
this helped in expanding the actors within the content 
layer, and in attracting potential IPTV partners.  
 
4.1.7. Platform stack #7. Although the business 
through the IPTV operators was steadily growing, and 
although G-cluster received new content for its 
platform from several well-known game publishers, the 
delivery of the game content was limited to the IPTV 
operators. This made the total market coverage for the 
games relatively small. Furthermore, G-cluster realized 
that the negotiation processes for configuring client 
software for the operators’ set-top boxes was slow and 
time consuming. These difficulties led to competitive 
move #11. The aim was to expand the market and 
avoid the difficulties associated with IPTV operators, 
by-passing the strategic bottleneck that the latter 
created. This was accomplished by developing a cloud-
based game console. In 2013, G-cluster launched a 
cloud game console, called the “G-cluster gaming 
machine” in Japan, and later in the USA. The console 
was a small device with HDMI/USB adapters that 
enabled end-users to gain access to G-cluster’s cloud 
game server. As the cloud console used the OTT 
network, the service was available through any telecom 
operator’s broadband network. The cloud-based 
gaming console thus made it possible to expand market 
control at the device layer, i.e. beyond IPTV operators.  
 
4.1.8. Platform stack #8. In 2013 G-cluster decided to 
integrate its client software directly into (digital) TVs 
as their next competitive move (#12). This further 
expanded multihoming at the device layer. Bringing 
the cloud game console to the market also convinced 
TV manufacturers that the service would work over an 
OTT network. In late 2013, G-cluster signed a contract 
with two TV manufacturers (Sharp and LG), both of 
which integrated G-cluster’s client software for their 
initial TV setup. This was brought to the Japanese 
market in 2014.  
Because of the increased number of content 
delivery channels, G-cluster needed more content for 
their service. To speed up the acquisition and 
integration of the gaming content for its platform, G-
cluster developed a Codeless Integration Kit (CLIK) as 
its competitive move #13. CLIK demonstrated to game 
publishers how their games would work in the cloud 
environment, reduce the need for porting, and provide 
a quicker way to acquire content for the platform.  
In late 2014, G-cluster finally started to develop the 
platform toward its original target device, i.e. mobile 
phones (competitive move #14). For this purpose, the 
company established cooperation with Square Enix, 
which develops the role-play series Final Fantasy. 
Games that require about 60 gigabytes of memory to 
install, and which cannot be run on mobile devices, can 
now be played on mobile devices over 4G or Wi-Fi as 
a cloud service. G-cluster has configured the client 
software for the mobile games, and the client has been 
made available in Japan through Apple’s App Store 
and Google’s Play store.  
In 2014 G-cluster expanded its activities to the 
content layer by starting to develop exclusive content 
for its platform, seeking thus to attract more customers 
(competitive move #15). The games in question 
included features that permitted, for example, offline 
gaming using a mobile phone, and thereafter 
transference of the game figure from the mobile phone 
to TV. Continuation was possible by playing the game 
in the cloud environment, with more advanced 
graphics and features. In 2015, the company also 
expanded its market by developing client software for 
a Japanese cable TV provider J:COM (competitive 
move #16). The development of cable TV networks 
made it possible to run the service over the cable 
network. 
 
4.2. Competitive moves and the 
reconfiguration of the platform stack over time 
 
As can be observed from Figure 1, most of the 
platform stack reconfigurations prior to 2010 took 
place at the network and device layers, whereas later 
reconfigurations increasingly involved changes at the 
service and content layers. This marks a shift from 
removing technical bottlenecks and related control 
points towards creating new value propositions in 
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growing markets, and either creating or overcoming 
strategic bottlenecks. In specific terms, the first 
competitive moves were related to addressing an initial 
homing problem, i.e. finding a suitable network/device 
combination that would be sufficient to bring the 
service to the market. Competitive moves #1–#5 
focused mainly on overcoming technical bottlenecks 
related to low bandwidth at the network layer, and to 
the unreliable set-top box technology at the device 
layer. Platform stack reconfiguration #3 made it 
possible to commercialize the service through PCs and 
Macs, and reconfiguration #4 – operating at the 
network and device layers – expanded the service for 
IPTV. However, technical bottlenecks were also 
present at platform stack reconfiguration #5, when G-
cluster tried to enter IPTV markets through cable-TV 
operators. Here one can see how the instability of the 
technologies at the network and device layers hindered 
commercialization of the service in the early stages of 
platform evolution. Finally, competitive move #9 led to 
platform stack reconfiguration #6. This made it 
possible to commercialize the service through a 
credible and well-known IPTV provider.  
After platform stack reconfiguration #6, the 
competitive moves focused on market expansion and 
on creating novel value propositions on either side of 
the market. This included the introduction of new 
network and device combinations, managed via the 
same cloud-based solution. Considered in detail, 
market expansion was motivated by competitive moves 
#11, #12, and #16, within a device layer that was 
aimed to increase the multihoming of the platform via 
several devices. This increased the value of the 
platform to the content providers and end-users. 
Competitive moves #10 and #13-#15 (which were 
related to value propositions) focused mainly on the 
service and content layers. They facilitated new and 
more advanced content acquisition via SDK and CLIK 
at the service layer. 
 
4.3. The dynamics of the control over different 
layers of the platform stack 
 
For the most part, G-cluster operated within and 
sought to control the service layer. However, the actors 
in the network layer controlled access to the device 
layer during all of platform stack reconfigurations #1–
#6. These actors created both technical and strategic 
bottlenecks, since they controlled access and 
constrained possibilities to multihome the service at the 
device layer. Initially, technical bottlenecks played a 
major role, leading to constant platform stack 
reconfigurations in attempts to find a suitable 
combination at the network and device layers, with a 
view to creating a feasible service. Thereafter, the 
control points moved toward strategic control, within 
which IPTV providers controlled access to the devices 
and to end-users. Competitive move #11 and platform 
reconfiguration #7 made it possible to bypass this 
control point. The competitive moves here created 
autonomy through use of the company’s own device (a 
cloud gaming console); this provided direct access to 
the device layer via an operator-independent OTT 
model. After competitive move #11, G-cluster was in 
part able to take control of the device layer. 
On the other side of the platform, the content 
providers exercised strong control over the content 
provided by the platform. During platform stack 
reconfigurations #1–#5, the content providers were 
cautious about releasing content. This was mainly 
because of the undeveloped device and network 
technologies, plus relatively small market coverage. 
However, competitive move #9 opened up a larger 
market through a well-established IPTV provider, 
increasing the content provider’s willingness to 
provide content. In addition, G-cluster expanded its 
activities towards the content layer when it started to 
develop exclusive content for its service (competitive 
move #15).  
 
4.4. Managing increasing complexity through 
competitive moves 
 
The complexity of the platform increased through 
competitive moves #1–#8, as the platform had to be 
individually adjusted to different networks and devices. 
These increased the couplings between layers and 
related actors. As the complexity of the platform 
increased, it became increasingly difficult to manage 
the platform adequately. To solve the problem, G-
cluster implemented competitive move #9. This 
reconfigured the platform stack in such a way that its 
complexity decreased substantially. In this stack 
configuration, G-cluster created a new order by 
simplifying its network and device layers to such an 
extent that the company operated through only one 
reliable actor in the market. Moreover, the complexity 
could now be managed at the technical level through 
the increased technical maturity of the platform 
(competitive move #9). It was now possible to 
standardize interfaces with (i) the invoicing system, (ii) 
terminal devices, and (iii) channel menu selection. 
There was now a situation involving fewer actors and 
greater standardization of the interfaces. 
Platform complexity started to increase once again 
after platform stack reconfiguration #6. This involved a 
series of competitive moves: #11, #12, #14, and #16. 
These moves increased the number of actors and 
technologies involved at the network and device layers. 
In addition, the number of content providers increased 
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at the content layer. However, by this time, G-cluster 
had built up its capabilities to manage the increased 
complexity. The measures used included (i) creating a 
platform with standardized interfaces, (ii) controlling 
installations that had previously been coordinated 
through third parties, (iii) harmonizing the licensing 
model, and (iv) standardizing content acquisition via 
SDK and CLIK.  
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
 
This exploratory case study makes three notable 
contributions to previous literature and theory 
development in the context of digital platform 
evolution. Thus, our findings reveal: (1) how a digital 
platform evolves through competitive moves, (2) how 
competitive moves change the dynamics of control of 
the platform stack, and (3) how a platform owner can 
manage the increasing complexity. 
In the first place, the study illustrates how the 
platform owner can reconfigure the platform stack [3] 
over time by engaging in a sequence of competitive 
moves. In other words, by studying a platform change 
longitudinally, one can see how a nascent firm is able 
to build up a platform from scratch through an 
emergent pattern of competitive moves (cf. [14, 15, 
16]), and further, how the platform evolves over the 
period in question. The study contributes to 
competitive dynamics theory [14] in the context of 
digital platform evolution. The findings indicate that 
the possibility to reconfigure the platform stack is 
largely dependent on previous competitive moves, and 
on the capability of overcoming technical and strategic 
bottlenecks [cf. 11, 21]. This expands from competitive 
dynamic literature (see Chen and Miller [14] for a 
further review), which has ended to focus on the 
market entry of new products or services in traditional 
industries. In contrast, the present study shows how the 
same service can be applied to create new markets and 
value in multisided markets. Our conceptualization 
indicates that initial moves aim to multihome the 
platform and to remove technical bottlenecks. 
Thereafter, competitive moves focus on service and 
content layers, with the aim of creating value to end-
users and content providers within a chosen niche. As 
observed here, the advances of network and device 
technologies may also largely dictate the rationality of 
competitive moves.  
Secondly, our findings contribute to an 
understanding of how competitive moves change the 
dynamics of control over the layers of the platform 
stack. It can be concluded that within sequences of 
competitive moves, technical bottlenecks arise; these 
needs be solved at critical layers before a firm can 
consider expanding its control over other strategically 
important layers. In other words, by overcoming 
technical bottlenecks [11], a firm creates value and 
capabilities for subsequent moves aimed at expanding 
control over the platform stack. The overcoming of 
bottlenecks requires high scalability of the service to 
new devices and networks. Increased control also 
facilitates the outsourcing of value creation activities to 
other actors within the platform stack, as the actors 
become increasingly dependent on the platform owner. 
In the present case, the platform owner initially 
operated solely in the service layer. However, once 
technical bottlenecks were solved, the platform owner 
started to expand control over other strategically 
important layers (device and content). The rationality 
of expanding control was related to the need to 
overcome the strategic bottlenecks set by IPTV 
providers at the device and network layers, and to 
create more differentiated value for end users. 
Consequently, this increased the value of the platform 
for both sides of the market (cf. [3, 22]). The findings 
in this respect advance digital platform literature [1, 3, 
5, 12] by demonstrating how a digital platform owner 
may be able to shift control from one layer to other 
layers.  
Thirdly, we contribute to complexity theory [18, 
19, 20] in the context of digital platform evolution, by 
examining how competitive moves increase the 
complexity associated with a platform, and how such 
complexity could be managed. We indicate that 
platform complexity increases during an evolutionary 
process within which a firm overcomes technical or 
strategic bottlenecks, and moves to new markets by 
multihoming the platform. However, the complexity 
can be managed through competitive moves that focus 
on simplification, standardization, and control of the 
platform stack. By reducing the complexity, a platform 
owner can gain a more competitive position in the 
market, through having better control over different 
layers of the platform stack.  
Taking a broader view, the findings extend 
platform complexity research [4, 5] by demonstrating 
the reasons for increased platform complexity, and 
further, how the complexity can be managed through 
specific competitive moves. In particular, the findings 
indicate that the complexity of the platform increased 
during successive competitive moves, as new 
technologies emerged (cf. [18]), making it possible to 
multihome the platform across different devices and 
networks. In the present case, this increased the 
number of actors and couplings, not just on both sides 
of the platform [6, 8, 9], but also within different layers 
of the stack, making the management of the platform 
increasingly complex. This illustrates how a change at 
one layer of the platform stack can impact on other 
layers in the stack, thus demonstrating the nonlinear 
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outcomes of rapid co-evolution that are common for 
complex systems [18, 19]. All in all, it can be claimed 
that the findings lead to a better understanding of how 
firms may be able to manage and decrease platform 
complexity.  
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